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Technological Neutrality:  
Recalibrating Copyright in the 
Information Age
Carys J. Craig*
This Article aims to draw the connection between how we conceptualize 
legal rights over information resources and our capacity to develop 
technologically neutral legal norms in the information age. More 
specifically, it identifies and critically examines three competing 
approaches to the idea of technological neutrality apparent in copyright 
jurisprudence. Ultimately, it is argued that true technological neutrality 
requires not simply the seamless expansion of legal rights into new 
technological contexts, but the careful, contextual recalibration of rights 
and interests in light of shifting values and changing circumstances. 
As a normative principle, technological neutrality in copyright law 
thus demands a nuanced and relational understanding of the rights 
at play, and the social values that they seek to foster as technologies 
evolve. 
IntroductIon
If this is, indeed, the “information era” in which we find ourselves, then the 
power to own, control, and access information is surely the power that will 
define our era and determine our future. Just as control over the means of 
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production shaped the emergence and evolution of industrial might, so too 
must control over information determine the dynamics of postindustrial power. 
The law, which ascribes rights and protects privileges in relation to valuable 
resources, plays a key role in both allocating power and controlling its flow. 
In the information era, the law has continued to play its traditional role in 
granting rights and regulating behavior in relation to valuable resources — 
but increasingly the resource is information itself. The idea of a constitution 
of information evokes a particular vision of legal rights held by individuals 
over information — including rights over the intangible works in which 
information is found. The focus of this Article is on the law’s allocation of 
rights over information resources through the particular vehicle of copyright 
law. Specifically, it is concerned with how the law’s allocation and enforcement 
of copyright responds (or refuses to respond) to technological change — and 
to the shifting dynamics of information, creativity and communication that 
such change entails. 
There is nothing new about the fundamental nature of “information” or the 
simple fact of its creation and exchange that sets this so-called information 
era apart from its predecessors. The nature of our relationship to the creative 
works in which information is found, however, has always been informed 
by the technologies available for capturing and sharing these works. Thus it 
was the development of the printing press that precipitated the emergence 
of rules governing the printing of literary works; and it was the proliferation 
of affordable printing technologies that provoked into existence the modern 
copyright system.
In the past quarter century or so, the “digital shift” and the emergence and 
rapid proliferation of network technologies has again dramatically changed 
how we capture and share creative works, thereby altering in perceptible 
ways the value of information and its significance in our lived experiences.1 
The laws that have governed ownership over such informational “things” for 
hundreds of years have correspondingly swelled in importance to become a 
central component (and core determinant) of our information ecosystem. We 
should ask ourselves whether they merit this prominence2: are our copyright 
laws capable of appropriately allocating rights and protecting privileges in the 
information era, or are they playing a role in the allocation of power that could 
never have been anticipated — and cannot, now, be satisfactorily justified? 
It is with this question in mind that I hope to advance, in these pages, a 
fairly modest claim: if copyright’s centrality in our evolving information 
1 Cf. Niva Elkin-Horen, Tailoring Copyright to Social Production, 12 TheoreTical 
inquiries l. 309, 321 (2011).
2 Cf. Jessica liTman, DigiTal copyrighT (2d ed. 2006).
2016] Technological Neutrality: Recalibrating Copyright in the Information Age  603
ecosystem is to be justified, copyright law must at least be capable of adapting 
to the changing realities of information — changes in its flow, its value, and 
its role in human (economic, cultural and social) relations — that are the 
inevitable result of technological development. Copyright law must therefore 
be capable of changing with technology. 
This assertion may seem on its face to be at odds with the widely-touted 
principle of “technological neutrality,” according to which laws should 
be developed to be independent of any particular technology. Rather than 
changing in response to specific technological developments, goes the logic, 
our laws should rise above such reactivity to ensure the consistency and 
sustainability of regulations over time and across technologies. Seen in this 
way, the objective of our lawmakers should be to transcend the vagaries of 
technological innovation for the sake of both regulatory efficiency and, in a 
larger sense, the rule of law itself.3 To the contrary, I suggest, an appropriate 
understanding of technological neutrality necessitates active responsiveness 
to changing technologies. As a principled approach to copyright law, true 
technological neutrality should stand in stark contrast to what we might call 
“technology blindness.”4 Copyright laws that are essentially blind to the 
differences between old and new technologies can create massive inequalities 
between technologies, and their objectively “neutral” application will produce 
very different results over time. We should know by now that ostensibly neutral 
legal norms can render important differences invisible, and thereby fail to 
produce substantive equality between the differently situated. In copyright 
law, I argue, substantive equality between technologies requires shifting and 
adjusting the allocation, nature and scope of rights in order to consistently 
pursue the goals of copyright through the choppy currents of technological 
change. What is needed, in other words, is not technology blindness but a 
continuous process of “equilibrium adjustment” as technologies evolve.5 Real 
technological neutrality sustains a normative equilibrium in the face of change.
3 See Bert-Japp Koops, Should ICT Regulation Be Technology-Neutral?, in 
sTarTing poinTs for icT regulaTion: DeconsTrucTing prevalenT policy one-
liners 77 (Bert-Jaap Koops, Miriam Lips, Corien Prins & Maurice Schellekens 
eds., 2006). Rule of law considerations feature largely in what Koops identifies 
as Category C: the broad category of usage of “technological neutrality” related 
to “legislative technique.” 
4 Cf. Ian Hosein & Alberto Escudero Pascual, Understanding Traffic Data and 
Deconstructing Technology-Neutral Regulations 8 (Working Paper, 2002), 
http://www.it46.se/docs/papers/unece-latest-escuderoa-hoseini.pdf (“Attempts 
to be technology-neutral should be interrogated, lest in our blindness we reduce 
democratic protections and oversight under the deterministic veil of progress.”). 
5 Cf. Orin Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 
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By casting technological neutrality in these terms, this Article seeks to draw 
a connection between our conceptualization of rights over information and 
our capacity to develop technologically neutral legal norms in the information 
age. Ultimately, it warns that the more individualistic and rigid our vision 
of legal rights, the less technologically neutral our regulation of information 
is likely to be. I suggest that, in order to achieve the kind of technological 
neutrality that best serves the public purposes of copyright, we need to take 
a contextual and relational approach to the rights at play. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores competing conceptions 
of technological neutrality and endorses what I call the “expansive” vision of 
technological neutrality, which situates copyright disputes over new technologies 
in the context of the overarching purposes of the copyright system. This 
discussion is built primarily on an analysis of Canada’s recent Supreme Court 
copyright jurisprudence on the meaning and role of technological neutrality. 
Part II explores various difficulties associated with traditional rights-based 
reasoning in the copyright context, showing how it supports a restrictive 
and unsatisfactory approach to technological neutrality. It then sketches out 
a “relational” theory of copyright law and suggests the advantages of this 
approach in actively responding to new technologies. The Article concludes 
that an authors’ rights-based approach to copyright obstructs rather than 
facilitates the development of a technologically neutral copyright law, to 
the detriment of the copyright system and, more broadly, our information 
ecosystem. Fundamentally, the capacity to develop and apply law in a manner 
responsive to changing technological realities requires a purposive approach to 
structuring the legal relationships between people, information and technology. 
I. conceptual approaches to technologIcal neutralIty
A. Introducing Technological Neutrality
As it is commonly understood, the principle of technological neutrality prescribes 
that laws can and should be developed in such a way that they are independent 
125 harv. l. rev. 426 (2011) (describing how changing technology and 
social practice can destabilize the balance of police power of traditional Fourth 
Amendment rules, and suggesting that courts might respond to these new facts 
by adjusting legal rules to restore the preexisting balance of police power — a 
response Kerr calls “equilibrium adjustment”). In similar terms, I see technological 
neutrality as requiring “a case-by-case reassessment of preexisting law in light 
of present-day realities” in order “to restore the status quo” of the copyright 
balance. Id. at 492. 
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of any particular technology, neither favoring nor discriminating against specific 
technologies as they emerge and evolve. Perhaps because technologically 
neutral laws hold the promise of sustainability in a time of rapid technological 
change, the principle is regularly invoked as an uncontested regulatory starting 
point.6 While the general wisdom seems to be that technological neutrality 
is, like “motherhood and apple pie,” an unquestionably good thing, Chris 
Reed has rightly cautioned that “this consensus among legislators seems to 
have developed in an almost complete absence of any clear understanding 
[of] what the term ‘technology neutrality’ might actually mean.”7 Similarly, 
Brad Greenberg has recently observed that technological neutrality is “under-
theorized and, thereby, poorly understood. While scholars frequently refer 
vaguely to the principle, few have conceptualized it, and legislators have 
accepted it without critical inquiry.”8 
In fact, technological neutrality has many shades of meaning, and, of 
course, different meanings can produce differing applications with more or 
less desirable results. In this Part, drawing on a fuller analysis that I have 
presented elsewhere,9 I identify what I perceive to be three different approaches 
to conceptualizing technological neutrality in the copyright context, all of 
which are discernable in the jurisprudence both in Canada and internationally. 
I sketch out these approaches in broad terms, and then argue that the third 
approach — the “expansive” interpretation — should be preferred. It avoids 
the shortcomings of the more restrictive approaches and holds the key to 
maintaining a normatively justifiable copyright system over time.
At the outset, however, I should acknowledge that actual technological 
neutrality is not, in my view, an attainable state for copyright law; it is more 
akin to a normative quest. I doubt it can truthfully be said of any law that it is 
“technologically neutral,” at least as an objectively verifiable claim without 
caveat. Neutrality itself is illusive — a myth too often invoked to obscure the 
realities of inequality, self-interest or political agenda — and the principle 
of technological neutrality is no different. As such, the three versions of the 
principle to which we now turn are best understood as interpretive tools, 
which have been and may be deployed in the task of applying copyright law 
6 Koops, supra note 3, at 77-78. 
7 Chris Reed, Taking Sides on Technology Neutrality, 4 scripT-eD 263, 265 
(2007). 
8 Brad A. Greenberg, Rethinking Technology Neutrality, 100 minn. l. rev. 1495, 
1498 (2016). 
9 See Carys J. Craig, Technological Neutrality: (Pre)Serving the Purposes of 
Copyright Law, in The copyrighT penTalogy: how The supreme courT of 
canaDa shook The founDaTions of canaDian copyrighT law 271 (Michael 
Geist ed., 2013).
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in new technological circumstances.10 None can produce a law that transcends 
technological realities; each offers a route by which to reason about how the 
law ought to apply. (And each, of course, has the potential to serve specific 
interests, and advance particular agendas.) 
B. Three Approaches to Technological Neutrality
I argue that there are essentially three conceptual approaches to technological 
neutrality, which I have labelled the restrictive, intermediate and expansive 
approaches. With these labels, I mean to describe the scope of the principle 
as understood: what it is that we can see, and what we focus on, when we 
look at copyright law through the lens of technological neutrality. A restrictive 
approach to technological neutrality takes the narrowest view, zooming in 
to focus on the words of the statute and the technical activities at issue. 
With this lens, we can simply seek to apply the law as written to the new 
technological activity. The intermediate approach broadens its focus, pulling 
out the metaphorical lens a little in order to capture a wider frame: with this 
lens, we can see not just the activity but the end result of the activity, or the 
function it performs. We can then seek to apply the law in a “functionally 
equivalent” way; that is, applying it equally to new technologies having the 
same function or effect as older technologies. Finally, the expansive approach 
pulls out still further, until it captures within its wide-angle frame not only 
the specific activity and its function or effect, but also where this activity fits 
within the broader context of the copyright system and its purposes. With 
an expansive understanding of technological neutrality, then, we can seek to 
apply the law to new technologies in a purposive manner that consistently 
advances the normative goals of copyright. Without getting mired in the 
technical details of particular cases, this Section identifies and describes these 
competing conceptions and articulations of technological neutrality as found 
in the Canadian jurisprudence.11 
i. The Restrictive Approach: Formal Nondiscrimination
The first approach to technological neutrality in copyright law is what I call 
the “restrictive approach”: it has a narrow focus on the words of the statute and 
the specific technological activities undertaken by the defendant. Its purpose 
is to ensure that copyright applies to all technologies, even those unforeseen 
10 I am indebted to Julie Cohen for this characterization of the three approaches 
to technological neutrality that I describe as, essentially, interpretive tools. 
11 For a more detailed description and analysis of the facts and ratios in each of 
the key Canadian cases, see Craig, supra note 9. 
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technologies that could not have been within the contemplation of the legislative 
drafters. While broad in its potential reach, the approach is restrictive insofar 
as it is concerned only with the extension of copyright’s exclusive rights to 
new technologies notwithstanding the differences between the new and old. 
It is aimed at ensuring the continued capacity of rights-holders to control and 
exploit protected works on new platforms and in new media. When regarded 
as such, the concept is effectively synonymous with “media neutrality,” and 
finds its grounding, in the Canadian context, in the copyright owner’s right of 
reproduction “in any material form.”12 An unauthorized reproduction, whether 
made by copying by hand, by photocopier, camera or computer, triggers the 
reproduction right for copyright purposes.13 The approach is “means-oriented” 
in the sense that it is concerned with the application of law to new technical 
means for using and exploiting protected works. Taking this approach, one is 
likely to adopt what Brad Greenberg calls the “internal perspective”: looking 
inside a machine or process to identify infringing activities rather than focusing 
on the outputs of technological processes.14 
In the Canadian jurisprudence, the basic expression of this restrictive 
approach to technological neutrality is found in the dissenting judgment of 
Justice Rothstein in Entertainment Software Association (ESA) v. Society of 
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada15: “Media neutrality means 
that the Copyright Act should continue to apply in different media, including 
more technologically advanced ones.”16 This statement reflects a narrow 
vision of technological neutrality as concerned only with nondiscrimination 
between technological means in a formalistic sense: the law remains equally 
applicable across different technologies. The emphasis is not on the effect 
of the law as such, or the effects of technological change, but on the law’s 
extension to new contexts. Thus, the author of a newspaper article can control 
its reproduction in an electronic database, and the copyright owner in a 
12 See Gregory R. Hagen, Technological Neutrality in Canadian Copyright Law, 
in The copyrighT penTalogy, supra note 9, at 307, 314-15.
13 Cf. Brad Greenberg, Aereo and the Spirit of Technology Neutrality, concurring 
opinions, http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/06/aereo-and-the-spirit-
of-technology-neutrality.html (last visited 29 Apr., 2015).
14 Greenberg, supra note 8, at 1537.
15 Entm’t Software Ass’n (ESA) v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Can., [2012] S.C.C. 34 (Can.) (concluding that the download 
of a videogame containing a musical work constituted a “communication by 
telecommunication” of that work for which compensation was due).
16 Id. ¶ 121. Justice Rothstein was quoting from the majority ruling in Robertson v. 
Thomson Corp., [2006] S.C.C. 43 ¶ 49 (Lebel & Fish JJ. writing for Bastarache, 
LeBel, Deschamps, Fish & Rothstein JJ.) (Can.). 
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musical work should be recompensed when a copy is transmitted online.17 
The underlying assumption is that the legal rights recognized in respect of 
the old technology must be equally worthy of recognition and protection in 
the new technological setting. 
To the extent that broader policy concerns are considered in this restrictive 
neutrality analysis, the concern tends to be with the continued recognition 
and protection of authors’ or owners’ rights as technologies change, with a 
view to ensuring the owner’s continued ability to exploit the work, even in 
new ways and in unforeseen markets. This is clear in the dictum endorsed by 
Justice Rothstein, who continues: “Media neutrality is not a license to override 
the rights of authors — it exists to protect the rights of authors and others as 
technology evolves.”18 The restrictive approach thus tends to be invoked (or 
at least implicitly at play) when finding infringement by users of new media. 
In keeping with this approach, in the recent case of Canadian Broadcasting 
Corp. v. SODRAC 2003 Inc.,19 Justice Rothstein, now writing for the majority, 
emphasized that the principle of technological neutrality, though “central to 
Canadian copyright law, . . . cannot change the express terms of the Copyright 
Act.”20 The case involved “broadcast-incidental” digital copies of works 
made to facilitate licensed broadcasting. The Court held that such copies 
were reproductions like any other, and so engaged the reproduction right as 
would any non-exempted copy, based simply on the plain language of the 
statute. Differences between broadcast-incidental copying practices in analog 
and digital contexts would not justify treating digital copies differently: seen 
through the restrictive lens, then, the law as written simply extends into the 
new technological context, treating a copy as a copy. 
ii. The Intermediate Approach: Functional Equivalence
What I have called the “intermediate approach” to technological neutrality 
gives a broader significance to the concept. It is concerned not simply with 
equal treatment of rights across technologies, but with achieving similar 
outcomes for functionally equivalent technological processes. Whereas the 
restrictive version of the principle demands only that “the Copyright Act 
should continue to apply in different media,”21 an intermediate approach such 
17 Robertson, [2006] S.C.C.; Entm’t Software Ass’n (ESA), [2012] S.C.C. (Rothenstein, 
LeBel, Fish and Cromwell JJ., dissenting).
18 Id. ¶ 49.
19 Can. Broad. Corp. (CBC) v. SODRAC 2003, Inc., [2015] S.C.C. 57 (Can.).
20 Id. ¶ 51; see Gregory Hagen, Interpreting the Right of Reproduction in SODRAC, 
inTell. prop. J. (forthcoming 2016) (arguing that this ruling reflected an unduly 
restrictive approach to the role of principle in statutory interpretation). 
21 Robertson, [2006] S.C.C. at ¶ 49.
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as that adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Society of Composers, 
Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Bell Canada aims to ensure that 
the law is applied “in a way that operates consistently” across different media, 
“regardless of the form of media involved, or its technological sophistication.”22 
The emphasis is not on formal nondiscrimination between technologies, but 
rather on achieving substantive equivalence of effect when the law is applied 
across different technologies. In this case, the Court declined to assess the 
“amount” of the use in a fair dealing analysis based on the aggregate number 
of music samples streamed to consumers because to do so would disadvantage 
digital dealings, thereby undermining the goal of technological neutrality. The 
formulation offered by Justice Abella and accepted by the full bench in the 
Bell case thus suggests a more functional and effects-oriented approach to 
technological neutrality, ensuring that no effective disadvantage is suffered 
by those who make use of new technological means.23 
Because it is effects-oriented, the perspective adopted for the intermediate 
approach is typically “external” in focus: looking to what the technology 
accomplishes rather than the technical processes involved in producing the 
outcome. Another way to think of this is to view the technology as a “black 
box” whose internal contents are invisible: what matters to the decision-
maker is what goes in, and what comes out. The external perspective, then, 
“looks only at the technological output — at what, not how,”24 and thus 
avoids many of the pitfalls of technical specificity (not the least of which is 
technical complexity beyond the ken of the average lawyer or judge). Thus, 
in Rogers v. SOCAN, the Supreme Court treated on-demand streaming as a 
performance in public, analogous to traditional broadcasting, notwithstanding 
the technical differences between “push” and “pull” technologies: “If the 
nature of the activity in both cases is the same, albeit accomplished through 
different technical means, there is no justification for distinguishing between 
the two for copyright purposes.”25 
22 Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Bell Can. [2012] 
S.C.C. 36 ¶ 43 (Can.).
23 In Bell, the Court expressed concern that, for the purposes of conducting a fair 
dealing analysis, assessing the “amount” of dealing in light of the aggregate 
amount of uses would lead to disproportionate findings of unfairness in respect 
of dealings with digital as opposed to non-digital works. Such an interpretation, 
it was said, would undermine the goal of technological neutrality in copyright 
law. Id.
24 Greenberg, supra note 8, at 1537 (citing Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective 
in Internet Law, 91 geo. l.J. 357, 357 (2003)). 
25 Rogers Communications, Inc. v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Can., [2012] S.C.C. 35 ¶ 29 (Rothstein J.).
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The intermediate approach differs from the restrictive approach to the extent 
that it engages with policy considerations beyond merely the reach of copyright 
protection. As the Bell case demonstrates, the intermediate approach, in its 
quest for functional equivalence, looks not only to the extension of owners’ 
rights but also justifies the extension of users’ rights (in the form of defenses 
and exceptions to infringement26) to achieve a technologically neutral result. 
In this way, it offers, at least potentially, a far more nuanced analysis of what 
technological neutrality ought to entail in particular circumstances. 
Because the goal is to achieve substantively equivalent results across 
different media, fairness to all parties means not disadvantaging users for 
employing new or more sophisticated technologies to achieve equivalent 
ends. This permits, at least notionally, the possibility of different treatment 
for substantively different technologies in order to ensure an equivalent result. 
Whereas, for example, traditional broadcasting techniques required the making 
of only a few incidental copies, the vastly inflated number of reproductions 
involved in digital broadcasting may necessitate different treatment of those 
copies. So, having held that broadcast-incidental digital copies trigger the 
reproduction right, the Court in CBC proceeded to apply the principle of 
technological neutrality to the valuation of the royalties payable in respect of 
such copies. This aspect of the majority reasons adopts what is arguably an 
intermediate approach, in the sense that it focuses on the outcome or effect of 
the use (albeit in value-based terms) and seeks to ensure that commensurate 
legal obligations attach to an act of equivalent (economic) effect: “[I]n the 
valuation of a right, technological neutrality requires that different technologies 
using reproductions of copyright protected work that produce the same value 
to the users should be treated the same way.”27
26 See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2004] S.C.C. 13, [2004] 
1 S.C.R. 339 (Can.) (the Supreme Court of Canada first declaring that “exceptions 
to copyright infringement” were “more properly understood as users’ rights”) 
(emphasis added).
27 Can. Broad. Corp. (CBC) v. SODRAC 2003, Inc., [2015] S.C.C. 57 ¶ 72. The 
passage continues: “Conversely, different technologies using reproductions that 
produce different values should not be treated the same way. . . . Technological 
neutrality requires that the Board compare the value derived from the use 
of reproduction in the two technologies in its valuation analysis.” Id. ¶ 72. 
Respectfully, the majority erred, in my view, by relegating consideration of 
technological neutrality to the valuation of royalties. The vehicle of tariff-setting 
involves a market-driven assessment of the value of licensed copies, while 
technological neutrality should guide the analysis of whether such copies need 
to be licensed at all. 
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The intermediate and restrictive approaches to technological neutrality 
can produce very different — sometimes contradictory — conclusions about 
the appropriate application of copyright doctrine in particular cases. The 
intermediate approach avoids some, but not all, of the limitations inherent 
in the restrictive approach to technological neutrality. Rather than simply 
protecting rights across different or previously unanticipated media, it seeks 
to avoid discriminating between functionally equivalent technologies. The 
analysis is therefore geared towards achieving substantively equal treatment of 
new technologies, at least where a functionally equivalent process previously 
existed: activities with equivalent outcomes receive similar legal treatment. 
Cast in these terms, however, the analysis remains rooted in the specific 
activity in question and its immediate effect. Where it is possible to say that 
one activity is functionally equivalent to another, this provides a shortcut to a 
technology-neutral conclusion.28 But it is not always possible to compare one 
analog activity to a digital one, and not all technological advances proceed 
in so linear or parallel a fashion. The reliance upon technological analogy is 
often unhelpful, being capable of producing conflicting but equally credible 
arguments that lead inexorably to incompatible conclusions. The recent case of 
American Broadcasting Co. v. Aereo, Inc. affords a good example.29 Reliance 
upon technological analogy permitted the ultimately successful argument that 
the one-to-one transmission of a digitized signal was sufficiently “cable-like” 
to constitute public performance and attract liability in the same way as would 
a cable transmission. A conflicting but compelling technological analogy was 
available to support the argument that the defendant’s digital time-shifting 
service was functionally equivalent, if technically superior, to the traditional 
VCR, and should thus be treated similarly in law (i.e., as a means of carrying 
out a personal, non-infringing use).30 The competing but apt analogies in this 
case merely begged the question. 
The choice of analogy may, then, have the unfortunate effect of appearing 
to require a particular conclusion, when really the desired conclusion requires 
a particular choice of analogy. Worse still, use of analogy to compare activities 
across technologies is often misleading, causing the decision-maker to overlook 
differences and fail to perceive the larger paradigm shifts that occur through the 
28 See Deborah S. Tussey, Technology Matters: The Courts, Media Neutrality, and 
New Technologies, 12 J. inTell. prop. l. 427, 479 (2005). 
29 Am. Broad. Co. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
30 Brief Amici Curiae of Law Professors and Scholars in Support of Respondents, 
at 22-23, Am. Broad. Co., 134 S. Ct., http://isp.yale.edu/sites/default/files/
American%20Broadcasting%20Companies%20v.%20Aereo.pdf (citing Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
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iterative process of technological advancement.31 By contrast, the “expansive” 
approach to technological neutrality is less concerned with finding analogous 
processes or equivalent effects in particular instances, and more concerned 
with finding an appropriate resolution in light of changing technological 
realities and overarching policy concerns.
iii. The Expansive Approach: Prescriptive Parallelism
The expansive approach to technological neutrality operates as a guiding 
principle that informs the application of copyright law to new technologies: 
fundamentally, the principle is one of “prescriptive parallelism,” meaning that 
the balance of rights traditionally sought in copyright law should be preserved 
in new technological environments.32 What must remain equal in respect of 
new technology, then, is not the treatment of particular, potentially analogous, 
activities as such. Rather, what must be consistent across technologies is 
the application of core copyright concepts and doctrine in a manner that 
appropriately balances the rights and interests at stake — maintaining, in the 
face of technical change, the steady pursuit of copyright’s policy goals. It 
therefore requires doctrinal adaptability as the copyright balance is continually 
recalibrated in response to new developments. The expansive approach to 
technological neutrality as a guiding principle is neither primarily means- nor 
effects-oriented, but purpose-oriented. It supports substantive nondiscrimination 
between functional equivalents, writ large: it seeks outcomes to copyright cases 
that preserve the balance of rights in the digital realm. In this sense, technological 
neutrality operates as a framing principle, demanding a purposive or teleological 
application of old laws to new situations. Moreover, it necessitates not willful 
technology-blindness, but a clear-sighted recognition of the disruptive force 
and political significance of technological change. 
This expansive vision of technological neutrality is also discernable in 
Canada’s Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Robertson, which concerned 
the electronic archiving of newspaper articles, the minority described the 
electronic database as functionally equivalent to a library collection of printed 
31 If, for example, the writing of fan fiction has been fundamentally transformed by 
the establishment of online communities for sharing and peer review, analogizing 
fan-ficcing to the offline activities of reading groups or writing clubs risks 
missing the point. See Betsy Rosenblatt & Rebecca Tushnet, Transformative 
Works: Young Women’s Voices on Fandom and Fair Use, in egirls, eciTizens 
385, 388 (Jane Bailey & Valerie Steeves eds., 2015).
32 Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & P. Samuelson, A Reverse Notice 
and Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected 
Copyrighted Works, 22 Berkeley Tech l.J. 981 (2007). 
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newspapers.33 Beyond such analogies, however, the dissenting judgment 
articulated a principled commitment both to the purposes of copyright law 
and to the promise of new technologies: 
The Copyright Act was designed to keep pace with technological 
developments to foster intellectual, artistic and cultural creativity. In 
applying the Copyright Act to a realm that includes the Internet and 
the databases at issue in this case, . . . the public benefits of this digital 
universe should be kept prominently in view. As Professor Michael 
Geist observes: “The Internet and new technologies have unleashed a 
remarkable array of new creativity, empowering millions of individuals 
to do more than just consume our culture, instead enabling them to 
actively and meaningfully participate in it.”34 
This broad vision supported the conclusion that the newspaper could 
lawfully reproduce print editions in the searchable electronic database, allowing 
the benefits of digitization to flow more freely. The expansive approach to 
technological neutrality reemerged in the majority reasons of Justices Abella and 
Moldaver in ESA, which analogized digital to traditional means of transferring 
copies of works, describing the internet delivery of digital copies as akin 
to a “technological taxi.”35 The risks of reliance on analogy were apparent 
when Justice Rothstein in dissent pointedly remarked that taxis “need not 
give free rides.”36 But the expansive approach to technological neutrality that 
informed the majority judgment was not reducible to the identification and 
like treatment of functional equivalents. Rather, the majority’s analysis built 
on the broader assertion that “[t]he traditional balance between authors and 
users should be preserved in the digital environment.”37 
33 Robertson v. Thomson Corp., [2006] S.C.C. 43 ¶¶ 88-90 (Abella J., writing for 
McLachlin C.J. & Binnie, Abella & Charron JJ.) (Can.) (“This is simply the 
electronic analogy to stacking print editions of a newspaper on a shelf.”).
34 Id. ¶ 79 (citing Michael Geist, Our Own Creative Land: Cultural Monopoly & 
The Trouble with Copyright 9, Lecture Given at Hart House Committee, Toronto, 
Can. (Mar. 7, 2006), http://cdn.michaelgeist.ca/wp-content/uploads/2006/05/
hhl06_Online_Book.pdf).
35 Entm’t Software Ass’n (ESA) v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Can., [2012] S.C.C. 34 ¶ 5 (Can.).
36 Id. ¶ 50. The majority judgment drew a less vulnerable analogy when it compared 
downloading to a store clerk putting a copy of the work in the hands of the end 
user. 
37 Id. ¶¶ 7-8 (citing Carys Craig, Locking Out Lawful Users: Fair Dealing and 
Anti-Circumvention in Bill C-32, in from ‘raDical exTremism’ To ‘BalanceD 
copyrighT’: canaDian copyrighT anD The DigiTal agenDa 177 (Michael Geist 
ed., 2010)).
614 Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 17:601
With this purpose in mind, the majority found that technological neutrality 
meant avoiding the imposition of “an additional layer of protections . . . based 
solely on the method of delivery of the work to the end user.”38 Imposing 
“gratuitous costs”39 on the use of new and more efficient technologies would 
upset the copyright balance in the digital environment, contrary to the principle 
of technological neutrality. Rather than simply extending the communication 
right to cover the online transmission, technological neutrality meant refusing 
to extend copyright liability onto new “technologies and activities that, 
while theoretically capable of being included under the [Copyright] Act, 
only incidentally implicate copyright.”40 The Court’s expansive vision of 
technological neutrality thus allowed it to limit the scope of the right to avoid 
disadvantaging users of new technologies and thereby obstructing the larger 
goals of the copyright system.
It is unfortunate, in my view, that the majority approach in ESA became the 
minority approach in the recent CBC case, in which Justice Abella’s dissenting 
reasons exemplified the expansive version of technological neutrality as I have 
described it. Faced with the question of whether digital broadcast-incidental 
copies should be treated as reproductions for copyright purposes, Justice 
Abella situated it in the context of copyright’s purpose: 
The question in this case, once again, is how to preserve [the balance 
that best supports the public interest in creative works] in the face of 
new technologies that are transforming the mechanisms through which 
creative works are produced, reproduced and distributed. . . . The 
answer to this challenge, in my view, lies in applying a robust vision 
of technological neutrality as a core principle of statutory interpretation 
under the Copyright Act.41
The robust vision that Justice Abella propounds combines media neutrality 
(protecting “the rights of users [as well as owners] of copyrighted material across 
new media”42) with functional equivalence (“focus[ing] on the essential character 
of the activity and not the technical modalities by which it is achieved”43) in 
the context of copyright’s purpose (“to protect the fine balance between users 
38 Id. ¶ 121.
39 Id. ¶ 9. 
40 See Cameron Hutchinson, Technological Neutrality Explained (& Applied to 
CBC v. SODRAC) (Working Paper, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2533734.
41 Can. Broad. Corp. (CBC) v. SODRAC 2003, Inc., [2015] S.C.C. 57 ¶¶ 147-148 
(Can.).
42 Id. ¶ 151. 
43 Id. ¶ 164.
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and creators, between access and reward, enshrined in the Copyright Act.”44) 
The dissenting reasons strive for substantive nondiscrimination between 
functional equivalents, looking at external outcomes and effects rather than 
internal processes, and taking a purposive interpretation of the statute that 
“seeks to preserve the accepted balance between creators and users in the 
digital environment.”45 With this expansive vision of what technological 
neutrality entails, the minority concludes:
The essential character of the broadcasting activity does not change with 
the adoption of modern digital technologies that are dependent on the 
creation of incidental copies in order to accomplish the activity. Each 
broadcast-incidental copy is not a separate reproduction of the work 
under the Act simply because the technical imperatives of effecting a 
broadcast require the presence of multiple copies. They do not, as a 
result, attract separate royalties. To conclude otherwise is to doom both 
technological neutrality and the ability of copyright law to preserve 
the delicate balance between the rights of copyright holders and the 
public’s interest in the dissemination of creative works.46
C. Interim Conclusion: Technological Neutrality and the Principled 
Approach 
To summarize, the expansive approach to technological neutrality recognizes, as 
a guiding principle, that the interpretation of copyright law in new technological 
contexts should maintain the appropriate balance of rights in furtherance of 
copyright’s purposes. It is much broader in its vision than is the restrictive 
proposition that copyright should, subject to the express terms of the statute, 
extend to cover previously unknown technical means and processes. It is also 
much more ambitious and flexible than the intermediate claim that copyright 
should simply treat functionally equivalent actions in a similar way. Tasked 
with conducting copyright’s “equilibrium adjustment,” it therefore requires 
a reassessment of the law in light of present-day technological realities in 
order to preserve or restore the copyright balance.
Now it might be argued that the conclusion I offer is no conclusion at 
all. Is the expansive version so vague in its assertions that any application 
of law might equally claim the badge of “technological neutrality”? As with 
legal principles generally, it is true that technological neutrality in this sense 
44 Id. ¶ 157.
45 Id. ¶ 181.
46 Id. ¶ 164.
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does not dictate a particular answer to a particular legal question.47 It does, 
however, relieve us of the obsessive internal examination of technological 
processes, which is, from a policy perspective, hardly worthwhile; and it 
allows us to escape intractable debates about which analogies most aptly 
apply to describe new technology-enabled activities. Simply put, it reminds 
us of the question we should be asking: given the new realities of the current 
technological environment, what rights should we recognize — and subject 
to what limits — if we aim to advance the objectives of the copyright system? 
It is the search for this answer that should guide the application of the law in 
respect of new technologies.48 
Greenberg identifies several fundamental problems associated with the 
principle of technological neutrality in his well-reasoned argument against 
neutrality and in favor of technological discrimination. Central among them 
is the following claim:
Technology neutrality discounts, if not overlooks countervailing reasons 
to avoid future-proofing and the downsides to treating differences 
alike. Significantly, technology neutrality assumes the appropriateness 
of old laws regulating new technologies. Yet fading normativity and 
elusive neutrality . . . make technology neutrality both suboptimal and 
self-defeating.49
The problems identified by Greenberg speak accurately to the difficulties 
associated with the restrictive and, to a significant degree, intermediate 
approaches to technological neutrality as I have attempted to describe them.50 
47 At least, it does not do so for any decision-maker bar Dworkin’s Hercules. 
Hutchinson, supra note 40, describes technological neutrality as a legal principle 
in the sense most famously explicated by Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin’s imaginary 
“Hercules” is an ideal judge capable of finding, through the application of 
legal rules and principles, the “right” answer to any legal problem. See ronalD 
Dworkin, Taking righTs seriously 75, 105 (1978). 
48 A common criticism of the concept of technological neutrality as employed in 
Entm’t Software Ass’n (ESA) v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers 
of Can., [2012] S.C.C. 34 (Can.), is that it provides no practical guidance on 
future rulings. See Can. Broad. Co. v. SODRAC 2003 Inc., 2014 F.C.A. 84, 
118 C.P.R. 79 (4th) (Can.). However, viewed as a legal principle, or simply 
as an interpretative tool, the criticism is overstated. That it does not produce 
a particular practical solution to a specific legal problem is not an appropriate 
basis on which to dismiss a guiding principle as unhelpful. 
49 Greenberg, supra note 8, at 1522-23.
50 Greenberg identifies four core problems: Prediction (legislators cannot know 
whether and to what extent current laws should regulate new and unpredictable 
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Thus, for example, the simple “ex ante application of the law to new technologies” 
that is envisioned in the restrictive approach wrongly “assumes that subjecting 
extant and future technologies to copyright liability imposes the same costs 
and benefits to the copyright system and to society.”51 Neither the intermediate 
nor the expansive versions of technological neutrality, however, should permit 
one to “overlook the possibility that different technologies warrant different 
treatment, [thereby] mistaking equal application for equivalence.”52 To the 
extent that a narrow approach to technological neutrality may, as Greenberg 
argues, fail to account for new technological uses that “disrupt the policies 
Congress previously balanced,”53 avoiding such disruption to the policy 
balance is precisely the point of the expansive approach. Moreover, there is 
no “pretense” of value-neutrality in the expansive approach. At its core lies 
the recognition that our copyright law reflects a particular understanding of 
the value of rewarding authors and encouraging creativity and dissemination 
of works. It directs attention to these normative assumptions rather than 
obscuring them, paving the way for a more open and fruitful debate about 
which norms should apply. 
The problems that Greenberg rightly identifies do not, then, necessitate 
the abandonment of technological neutrality in its expansive conception, nor 
undermine its principled significance. Technological neutrality in the expansive 
sense permits (indeed demands) that the law recognize, respond and adapt 
(sometimes in technologically specific ways) to new and disruptive or paradigm-
shifting technologies, rather than holding fast to previous legal constructs and 
reasoning by analogy. In my view, however, to abandon technological neutrality 
as an overarching principle would be to abandon the powerful notion that we 
must recalibrate copyright’s balance to new technological circumstances, and 
maintain normative vigilance as conditions change. Copyright requires this 
expansive vision of technological neutrality in order to appropriately adapt 
to technological change: only through constant recalibration and equilibrium 
adjustment can the law maintain the necessary balance of rights and interests 
to advance its purpose, and retain its legitimacy, in the digital age. 
technologies); Penumbra (the penumbra of doubt produced by technological change 
creates growing uncertainly in the law); Perspective (confusion about whether 
to adopt an internal or external perspective when analyzing new technological 
processes produces conflicting results); and Pretense (technological neutrality is 
not in fact neutral, and the pretense of neutrality obscures discrimination against 
new technologies). Id. at 1498.
51 Id. at 1523. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 1499.
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There is, however, a significant obstacle to this approach deeply embedded 
in our traditional copyright model, and it is to this that we now turn. The 
obstacle to which I refer is the common deontological commitment to copyright 
as primarily an author’s right; when the author’s right appears rigid and 
unchanging in the face of technological change, it inevitably limits copyright’s 
capacity to respond to new realities in a teleological way. Part II explores 
this connection between competing conceptions of the author’s right and 
competing approaches to technological neutrality. 
II. reconceptualIzIng (copy)rIght
A. Technological Neutrality and Rights-Based Rhetoric
My suggestion is that the restrictive approach to technological neutrality, 
as described above, is bound up with the rigid adherence to the idea of the 
author’s right to “own” his or her work. I have argued elsewhere that this 
commitment to authorial entitlement is ill-founded from a theoretical perspective, 
misunderstands the nature of authorship and expression, and unnecessarily 
stifles the cultural dialogue.54 My purpose here is more limited: I mean only 
to suggest, in this Section, that the rights-based approach to copyright anchors 
a restrictive version of technological neutrality. As such, it has the power to 
preclude the expansive approach to technological neutrality and to obstruct 
the pursuit of copyright’s purposes in the digital era. In the following Section, 
I propose a relational account of copyright that is more conducive to the kind 
of contextual analysis contemplated by the expansive approach. 
Before we proceed to look closely at the theory of copyright that best 
supports technological neutrality, however, it is important to identify in specific 
terms the way in which rights-based rhetoric and the value judgments about 
ownership claims are tied up in cases that tackle new technologies. 
i. Authors’ Rights and the Restrictive Approach to Technological Neutrality
We have already seen, in the descriptions of competing approaches to 
technological neutrality, statements that reveal the values informing each 
approach. Specifically, we might begin by recalling the statement that informed 
both the majority ruling in Robertson and the dissent in ESA, propounding 
a limited role for technological neutrality, restrictively construed: “Media 
neutrality is not a licence to override the rights of authors — it exists to protect 
54 See carys J. craig, copyrighT, communicaTion anD culTure: TowarDs a 
relaTional Theory of copyrighT law (2011).
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the rights of authors and others as technology evolves.”55 The primary focus was 
on protecting the rights of authors (and presumably other owners) in respect 
of the new technology.56 Media neutrality in this restrictive approach can only 
support, but cannot override, the extension of these ownership rights into new 
technological contexts. The majority’s technological neutrality analysis in CBC 
was similarly constructed around the right-holder’s entitlement to be justly 
compensated for use of the right, and the assumption that any value gained 
by the use of more efficient technology should flow back to the right-holder.57 
The British case of TV Catchup provides another interesting example. 
While not explicitly invoking the concept of media or technology neutrality, 
the facts of the case directly put in issue the question of whether and how old 
laws should constrain the exploitation of new markets made possible by new 
technologies. The defendant in the case offered a service that permitted its users 
to receive, via the internet, live streams of free-to-air television broadcasts 
that they were legally entitled to watch. When referred to the European Court 
of Justice, the Court approached the question with the following sentiment 
front of mind:
First of all, it is to be noted that the principal objective of [the Directive] 
is to establish a high level of protection of authors, allowing them to 
obtain an appropriate reward for the use of their works, including on the 
occasion of communication to the public. It follows that “communication 
to the public” must be interpreted broadly . . . .58
It proceeded to rule that “each transmission or retransmission of a work 
which uses a specific technical means must, as a rule, be individually authorised 
by the author of the work in question.”59 This was notwithstanding a previous 
ruling that “a mere technical means to ensure or improve reception of the 
55 Entm’t Software Ass’n (ESA) v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Can., [2012] S.C.C. 34 ¶ 49 (Can.) (Lebel & Fish JJ.) (cited by 
Rothstein J. ¶ 121). 
56 For an interesting discussion on this theme, see Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and 
Reality in Copyright Law, 94 mich. l. rev. 1197, 1198, 1239 (1996).
57 Can. Broad. Corp. (CBC) v. SODRAC 2003, Inc., [2015] S.C.C. 57 ¶¶ 70, 79 
(Can.).
58 Case C-607/11, on request from the High Court of England and Wales in the 
matter of ITV et al. v. TV Catchup Ltd. 2013 E.C.R. I-1 ¶ 20 (citing Directive 
2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related 
Rights in the Information Society [2001] OJ L167/12) (emphasis added); cf. Case 
C-325/14, SBS Belgium NV v. Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten 
en Uitgevers (SABAM), [2015] WLR (D) 466 ¶ 20. 
59 TV Catchup, 2013 E.C.R ¶ 24.
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original transmission within [an authorized] catchment area does not constitute 
a ‘communication.’”60 The Court reasoned that this limitation did not extend 
to cover a new transmission by improved means. Having prioritized the 
protection of the owner’s broad communication right, the Court paid little heed 
to arguments about the consumer interest in receiving the content to which 
they were entitled on a superior technical platform.61 The exclusive power to 
exploit the superior technical capability was reserved for the incumbent rights-
holder in a manner that reflects a restrictive understanding of technological 
neutrality.62 
The Australian case of National Rugby League Investments Pty Limited v. 
Singtel Optus Pty Ltd.63 raised a similar legal question about the lawfulness 
of a cloud storage personal recording service. Optus relied on an exception 
for private and domestic recording, which would permit, for example, the 
video-recording of the same content for later viewing. 64 The lower court, 
which accepted this argument, began its reasons by noting that “copyright 
legislation has had to balance the legitimate interests of the makers of original 
works and of ordinary citizens who use technological advances to copy those 
works for their own use in their private or domestic lives.”65 Focusing on 
balancing the various competing interests at play, and emphasizing the extent 
to which “daily life of persons in Australia and many other countries has 
transformed over the last 20 years with advances in technology,”66 the court 
60 Id. ¶ 28 (citing Football Ass’n Premier League v. QC Leisure, 2011 E.C.R. 
I-9083 ¶ 194).
61 It held that “the intervention of such a technical means must be limited to 
maintaining or improving the quality of the reception of a pre-existing transmission 
and cannot be used for any other transmission.” The technical intervention 
here was considered to be a “different” transmission and so not permissible 
improvement. Id. ¶¶ 28-29.
62 Lord Floyd of the English High Court subsequently determined that some of 
the transmissions, though implicating the communication right, benefitted 
from a cable retransmission defence under section 73 of the United Kingdom’s 
Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 c-48 (Order dated 7 October 2013). 
On appeal, the English Court of Appeal made a further reference to the Court 
of Justice regarding the permissible scope of the section 73 defence. [2015] 
EWCA Civ 204. 
63 Nat’l Rugby League Inv. Pty Ltd. v. Singtel Optus Pty Ltd., [2012] F.C.A.F.C. 
59 (Austl.). 
64 Copyright Act 1968, (Cth), s. 111 (Austl.).
65 Singtel Optus Pty Ltd. v. Nat’l Rugby League Inv. Pty Ltd. (No. 2), [2012] 
F.C.A. 34 ¶ 58 (Austl.) (emphasis added). 
66 Id. ¶ 60.
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extended the exception on the basis that the service offered is substantively 
no different from a VCR or DVR. The ruling was guided by an expansive 
vision of technological neutrality. Overturning this decision on appeal, the 
Full Court took a narrow approach, reasoning that the consumer was not solely 
responsible for making the copy, and giving short shrift to the significance of 
technological neutrality as a guide to statutory interpretation of exceptions: 
We are conscious that the construction which we are satisfied the language 
of s 111 requires is one that is capable of excluding, and does in fact 
in this instance exclude, a later technological development in copying. 
However, no principle of technological neutrality can overcome what 
is the clear and limited legislative purpose of s 111. It is not for this 
Court to re-draft this provision to secure an assumed legislative desire 
for such neutrality . . . .67
In the U.S. Aereo case, the majority similarly suggested that the extension 
of copyright exceptions to new technologies is the task of the legislature: “[T]o 
the extent commercial actors or other interested entities may be concerned with 
the relationship between the development and use of such technologies and 
the Copyright Act, they are of course free to seek action from Congress.”68 In 
the absence of such action, the Court emphasized the presumed Congressional 
intent to “protect a copyright holder from the unlicensed activities of Aereo 
as from those of cable companies.”69 Even in his dissenting reasons, Justice 
Scalia conceded, “I share the Court’s evident feeling that what Aereo is doing 
(or enabling to be done) to the Networks’ copyrighted programming ought 
not to be allowed.”70
These cases, and the way in which the rights and baseline expectations 
of rights-holders are framed, all indicate, in one sense or another, a default 
assumption that technological neutrality ought only to posit the extension 
of an owner’s exclusive rights onto new technological means of exploiting 
protected works and ensure just reward for such uses. Where an analysis of 
functional equivalence threatens to support the extension of user rights or 
otherwise to limit the owner’s rights in respect of exploiting the new technology, 
67 Nat’l Rugby League, [2012] F.C.A.F.C. at ¶¶ 96-99. The judgment continues: 
“In the present matter such are the conflicting interests and values, such are the 
possible consequential considerations of which account might need to be taken 
that, if a choice is to be made to extend or otherwise modify an exception such 
as s 111, this requires a legislative choice to be made, not a judicial one.”
68 Am. Broad. Co. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 17 (2014).
69 Id. at 13.
70 Id. at 12.
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the courts consistently retreat to the position that such limits require explicit 
action by the legislature. 
The implication, once again, is that copyright is primarily concerned with 
the protection of authors and owners; limits and exceptions must be explicit 
and clearly defined in respect of each new technological possibility, failing 
which authors’ rights should continue to reach seamlessly across disruptive 
technologies. This tacit assumption finds its more forthright expression in 
the Brief of Amicus Curiae Ralph Oman, Former Register of Copyrights of 
the United States: 
Whenever possible, when the law is ambiguous or silent on the issue at 
bar, the courts should let those who want to market new technologies 
carry the burden of persuasion that a new exception to the broad rights 
enacted by Congress should be established. That is especially so if that 
technology poses grave dangers to the exclusive rights that Congress 
has given copyright owners. Commercial exploiters of new technologies 
should be required to convince Congress to sanction a new delivery 
system and/or exempt it from copyright liability. That is what Congress 
intended.71
This argument makes explicit the unarticulated assumptions that often 
inform a restrictive vision of technological neutrality. Oman begins by noting: 
“There can be no serious dispute as to whether rights under the Copyright Act 
are broad, subject only to specific, narrow limitations enacted by Congress 
and that new developments in technology are not supposed to be able to 
truncate those rights.”72 Seen in this light, the role of technological neutrality is 
precisely to preserve strong authors’ rights in the face of technological change:
Congress drafted the Copyright Act to prevent the creative efforts of 
authors from being usurped by new technologies. That core principle 
is at the heart of the Copyright Act. Congressional intent would be 
71 Brief of Amicus Curiae Ralph Oman, Former Register of Copyrights of the 
United States, Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 17, http://jstyre.com/misc/Oman_
Amicus_20120921.pdf. For critical commentary on this Brief, see Kevin Smith, 
Coming Clean on Technical Neutrality, Duke univ. liBrary (Oct. 23, 2012), http://
blogs.library.duke.edu/scholcomm/2012/10/23/coming-clean-on-technological-
neutrality/; and Mike Masnick, Former Copyright Boss: New Technology Should 




72 Brief of Amicus Curiae Ralph Oman, supra note 71.
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undercut by any decision that would sanction the use of technologies 
which could be used indirectly to undermine its goals.73
While these words did not find their way into the written reasons of the 
Court, the Aereo ruling does reflect a similar impulse to safeguard the rights 
of copyright owners against the disruptive potential of new technological uses 
and users — and similarly fails to perceive any equal and opposite need to 
safeguard users’ rights as technology evolves. In my view, this is technological 
neutrality in its most restrictive — and least satisfactory — form. Far from 
preserving the balance of copyright, it loads up only one side of the balance 
with the weight to withstand technological change. The other side of the 
balance is left entirely vulnerable to the vicissitudes of technology and its 
exploitation. This is the flaw entailed by the traditional rights-based approach 
to copyright, which prioritizes above all else the protection of the author’s 
right in new technological contexts. 
ii. Balancing Rights and the Public Interest: Expanding Technological 
Neutrality
The cases in which technological neutrality is given a more expansive reading, 
and a more central role in guiding statutory interpretation, reveal a very different 
framing rhetoric that focuses on both the promise of new technologies, and 
the balance or public interest purposes at the core of copyright. 
We have already seen the dissenting Justices in the Canadian Robertson 
case lauding the potential of digital technologies to benefit the public and 
further the purposes of copyright law.74 Notably, their analysis began with a 
description of the overarching purposes of copyright as “promoting the public 
interest in the encouragement and dissemination of artistic and intellectual 
works, and justly rewarding the creator of the work.”75 Having emphasized the 
public interest in accessing archived newspapers and enjoying the “benefits 
of this digital universe,” this framing principle justified limiting the authors’ 
rights to control reproduction of their works.76
73 Id.
74 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
75 Robertson v. Thomson Corp., [2006] S.C.C. 43 ¶ 469 (Can.) (citing, inter alia, 
Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, 2002 
S.C.C. 34, ¶ 30 (Can.); CCH Can. Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2004] 1 
S.C.R. 339, 2004 S.C.C. 13, ¶ 23 (Can.); and Soc’y of Composers, Authors and 
Music Publishers of Can. (SOCAN) v. Can. Ass’n of Internet Providers, [2004] 
2 S.C.R. 427, 2004 S.C.C. 45 ¶ 40 (Can.)). 
76 Robertson, [2006] S.C.C. ¶ 70.
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The majority ruling in ESA similarly emphasized the centrality of balance 
in copyright, and the need to limit owners’ rights: ESA’s argument that 
the communication right was not implicated by online delivery of copies 
was “consistent with this Court’s caution in [Théberge], that the balance in 
copyright between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and 
dissemination of works and obtaining a just reward for the creator requires 
recognizing the ‘limited nature’ of creators’ rights.”77 The analysis of the 
minority in CBC, which concluded that incidental copies did not implicate 
the reproduction right, also began with recognition of copyright’s “careful 
balance” and a warning that “tilting the balance too far towards protection 
of creators’ rights would undermine the right of users to access and work 
with creative materials.”78 From this perspective, the additional value or 
economic gains created for users by virtue of new technologies was seen to 
“have nothing to do with the copyright holder’s legitimate interests,”79 giving 
rise to no additional entitlement for the right-holder.
A similar connection between a concern with copyright’s public interest 
purposes and the more expansive version of technological neutrality reveals 
itself in other cases beyond Canada, where courts made room for new actors to 
offer new technology-enabled services to consumers. In its ruling in Football 
Association Premier League v. QC Leisure, for example, the European Court 
of Justice wrote, with regard to the transient copying exception in Article 
5(1) of the Information Society Directive, that it “must allow and ensure the 
development and operation of new technologies and safeguard a fair balance 
between the rights and interests of right holders, on the one hand, and of users 
of protected works who wish to avail themselves of those new technologies, 
on the other.”80 With this concept of balance to the fore, it ruled that acts of 
reproduction performed within the memory of a satellite decoder and on a 
television screen fall within the exception and can therefore be carried out 
without the authorization of the copyright holders concerned. 
In RecordTV v. Mediacorp TV,81 Singapore’s Court of Appeal held that 
an “internet digital video recorder” for free-over-the-air content “did not 
77 Entm’t Software Ass’n (ESA) v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Can., [2012] S.C.C. 34, ¶ 7 (Abella & Moldaver JJ.) (Can.) 
(emphasis added).
78 Can. Broad. Corp. (CBC) v. SODRAC 2003, Inc., [2015] S.C.C. 57 ¶¶ 145-147 
(Can.).
79 Id. ¶ 182.
80 C-403/08, Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. QC Leisure and C-429/08, Karen 
Murphy v. Media Protection Serv. Ltd. ¶ 164 (joined cases) (citing Directive 
2001/29/EC, supra note 58). 
81 RecordTV Pte Ltd. v. MediaCorp TV Singapore Pte Ltd., [2010] S.G.C.A. 43 (Sing.).
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communicate” the plaintiff’s broadcasts to the public and was non-infringing. 
The Singapore Court framed its doctrinal analysis in the following purposive 
terms: 
In our view, where the Copyright Act is unclear as to how much copyright 
protection ought to be granted to a copyright owner, the courts should 
not be quick to construe a statutory provision so liberally as to deter 
or restrict technological innovations by preventing them from being 
applied in a manner which would benefit the public without harming 
the rights of the copyright owner. . . .
[T]he present appeal requires us to balance the competing interests 
of several stakeholders (viz, consumers, content providers as well as 
technology and service vendors) in a manner which would result in 
the most benefits to and impose the least costs on society as a whole.82 
Emerging from these judgments, I believe, is a simple but illuminating 
idea: the more committed a decision maker is to protecting authors’ rights 
as the primary purpose of copyright law, the more content she will be with 
a restrictive approach to technological neutrality; correspondingly, the more 
committed a decision maker is to the notion that the core principle of copyright 
is balancing author and user rights for the benefit of society as a whole, the 
more expansive her vision of technological neutrality becomes. With this idea 
in mind, my goal, in the next Section, is to suggest why traditional rights-based 
reasoning obstructs the path to substantive technological neutrality — and 
to briefly sketch an alternative relational approach that could better pave the 
way for copyright’s future. It is not possible here, of course, to provide a full 
account of what a relational approach to copyright might mean.83 I do hope, 
however, to at least join the dots between a more relational understanding of 
copyright and the expansive vision of a technology-neutral copyright system. 
B. Relational Rights and the Evolving Role of Copyright Law
In the liberal constitutional tradition, the language of rights has evolved to 
capture the notion that there are certain basic rights that no government can 
violate.84 Fundamental to this notion is the idea that these rights are immutable 
82 Id. ¶¶ 67-68.
83 I have begun to more fully explore a relational theory of copyright and how 
it might be engaged to reshape core elements of copyright doctrine in craig, 
supra note 54, at 50-59. 
84 See Jennifer neDelsky, law’s relaTions: a relaTional Theory of self, auTonomy, 
anD law 238 et seq. (2011). 
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and stable across time and place, and cannot be eroded or overridden by 
democratic will or shifting social morals.85 Rights, in this sense, serve the 
protective function of guarding individuals, and safeguarding their entitlements, 
against the wants, interests and subjective values of others. The right to 
free speech, for example, is protected even as the speaker’s views become 
less popular or more offensive to others over time. And as communication 
technologies evolve, that right extends not only to speech communicated in 
printed text or from the proverbial soapbox, but also to speech disseminated 
over new broadcasting media and in online spaces.86 Core to the liberal 
notion of the basic constitutional right is its capacity to transcend time and 
circumstance, thereby staking claim to something universal and unerring. 
Rights are thus reified as fixed entities.87 
It is not surprising, then, that the author’s claim to right — the proprietary 
right over the fruits of his creative labor — so often asserted or implicitly 
assumed in the context of our Western liberal copyright system, should perform 
a similar function of preserving and protecting an established entitlement in 
the face of changing circumstances and shifting social values.88 The celebrated 
immutability of the right-claim is, however, precisely the problem for a rights-
oriented copyright system trying to adapt to new technological challenges. 
Standing firm and unshifting in the face of technological change, the copyright 
claim-to-right refuses to bend and alter in response to technological evolution. 
It demands to be upheld and protected notwithstanding the many ways in 
which time and technology have come to challenge its purpose. This is what 
we have seen in the case law that invokes technological neutrality in its most 
minimalist form, as an interpretive tool to produce the strongest protection 
for the owner’s right. The ingrained notion of rights as trumps supports the 
triumph of copyright over conflicting interests of both users and providers 
of new technologies, as well as, potentially, the broader public interest in 
creative innovation. The vision of a technologically neutral copyright law as 
I have described it — responsive to change, recalibrating rights and interests, 
85 See Jeremy Waldron, A Rights-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 
oxforD. J. legal sTuD. 18 (2013). 
86 See William E. Lee, Books, Video Games, and Foul-Mouthed Hollywood 
Glitteratae: The Supreme Court and the Technology Neutral Interpretation of 
the First Amendment, 14 colum. sci. & Tech. l. rev. 295 (2013). 
87 See neDelsky, supra note 84, at 250; see also Duncan Kennedy, The Critique 
of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in lefT legalism/lefT criTique 178 (Wendy 
Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
88 See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 geo. l.J. 287 
(1988); see also Simon Stern, From Author’s Right to Property Right, 62 u. 
ToronTo l.J. 29 (2012).
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extending or restraining itself as its purposes demand — is obstructed by the 
prevailing conception of rights on which our copyright system so often relies.89 
The rhetoric of authors’ rights casts copyright as an individual’s natural 
entitlement, not amenable to pragmatic or principled alteration in the name 
of a broader public interest.90 Acknowledging, however, that claims of justice 
and fairness regarding artistic expression typically and increasingly do find 
their articulation in claims of rights (whether to property or free speech, 
copyright or users’ rights), then perhaps energies are better spent debating “not 
whether but how the language of rights will be used.”91 If the invocation of the 
author’s right stands in the way of expansive technological neutrality, perhaps 
technological neutrality needs a different understanding of the author’s right. 
A relational approach to rights analyzes legal rights in terms of the way 
they structure relationships. Pointing to the ever changing and continually 
contested nature of even basic rights such as property or equality, Jennifer 
Nedelsky regards rights as “a particular institutional and rhetorical means of 
expressing, contesting, and implementing . . . values,” where value means 
“any of the big abstractions used to articulate what a given society sees as 
essential to humanity or to the good life for its members.”92 Included within 
such values might be, for example, liberty, autonomy, freedom of expression 
and, indeed, “scope for individual and/or collective artistic expression.”93 
Since legal rights are the institutional implementation of societal values, the 
relational approach to resolving a rights dispute begins by asking how the law 
is structuring the relevant relations implicated in the dispute. It then proceeds 
to identify the values at stake; to ask what kinds of relationships would foster 
those values; and to consider how competing versions of the relevant right 
could structure those relationships in different ways.
Importantly, a relational approach to copyright recognizes and accepts 
that both the meaning of rights and the shared or common understanding of 
society’s core values change over time.94 As Nedelsky explains, “[a] focus 
on relationship automatically turns one’s attention to context and makes 
sense of the commonly held belief that there are some basic human values 
and that how we articulate and foster those values varies significantly over 
time and place.”95 It must also be attentive to the reality that core values are 
89 Sterk, supra note 56.
90 Cf. craig, supra note 54, at 86.
91 neDelsky, supra note 84, at 235.
92 Id. at 241.
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 243. 
95 Id. at 246.
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“disproportionately articulated and enforced by some powerful subset of 
the members of the society.”96 The relational approach thus demands broad 
access to platforms of public deliberation about society’s core values, and 
accepts that these values remain a site of constant contestation and possible 
transformation.
So what values might be said to be at stake in disputes about copyright 
and the new technological means by which it is exploited? The scope for 
individual creative expression is certainly implicated in debates about the 
claims to copyright protection in novel contexts. If, and to the extent that, 
protecting the owner’s copyright will continue to provide a necessary incentive 
or reward for artistic creativity in the digital age, proprietary relations between 
authors and users may be said to advance that value.97 Other relationships 
and other social values will also be at play, however, and these may benefit 
from competing versions of rights that would structure relations in alternative, 
nonproprietary ways.98 Particular circumstances such as we have seen in the 
case law implicate other relations between, for example, corporate service 
providers and their customers, authors and publishers, creators and their 
audiences, users and their peers. As for the social values at stake, we might 
consider the progress of science or capacity for technological innovation, the 
scope for collective artistic expression or creative exchange, the freedom of 
expression, the value of cultural or creative community engagement, access 
to knowledge and information, education, equality, and so on. 
As such, when we ask how the owner’s copyright should be applied in a 
new technological context, we ought to ask how different available versions 
of the copyright interest could structure the relationships between affected 
parties differently (authors and users, consumers and service providers, 
etc.). We would then consider how structuring these relationships differently 
(shifting obligations, protecting privileges and freedoms, allowing competition, 
facilitating cooperation, etc.) would foster values such as supporting artistic 
creativity, furthering progress of the arts, protecting free expression, promoting 
a vibrant public domain, and so forth. As with the expansive approach to 
technological neutrality, the point is not to produce a particular answer for 
a specific case, but to ask the important questions that ought to be asked in 
96 Id. at 243.
97 Cf. Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives 
Seriously, 71 u. chi. l. rev. 75, 88-89 (2004); see also roBerT p. merges, 
JusTifying inTellecTual properTy (2011).
98 Nedelsky’s fourth step in the relational approach is “to determine how competing 
versions of a right would structure relations differently.” neDelsky, supra note 
84, at 236.
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arriving at the best answer in the given context. As our lens pulls out to reveal 
relationships other than plaintiff versus defendant, and values other than 
simply protecting authors, there will be circumstances in which reinforcing 
proprietary relations, based on the power to exclude, will not suitably foster the 
social values at stake. In such cases, the legal dispute will not be appropriately 
resolved simply by recognizing and enforcing the owner’s copyright in the new 
technological context (as the restrictive approach to technological neutrality 
might have us believe). 
Copyright, it should be stressed, is not a primary value in itself, but a 
means by which to foster social values (in Nedelsky’s terms, a “second-order 
value”): with respect to other rights and values it should therefore be treated as 
instrumental and not fundamental.99 Copyright ought to foster free expression, 
for example, and cannot be given primacy over it. In disputes over copyright, 
we should examine the context of the dispute, the social values represented 
and implemented through copyright, and then ask whether the extension of 
copyright, its limitation, or the recognition of a countervailing user’s right, 
would best foster those values. As I see it, this line of inquiry closely mirrors 
the kind of contextual and dynamic approach to interpreting and applying 
copyright law that I have portrayed as essential to a substantively technology-
neutral copyright system. 
Thus, in Robertson, for example, the minority reasons described the 
relationship between freelance authors and publishers in the context of the 
larger public interest in archived newspapers as a resource, noting that the 
shared “interests of teachers, students, writers, reporters, and researchers” in 
using the materials were “hang[ing] in the balance between the competing rights 
of the two groups of creators in this case, the authors and the publishers.”100 
These passages implicitly invoked the social values at stake in the dispute 
— education, pursuit of knowledge, access to information — revealing 
an awareness of how the authors’ rights-claim, by restricting access and 
dissemination, might impede pursuit of those values. In ESA, the majority 
concerned itself with the relationship between consumers and distributors, 
invoking efficiency and competition as attendant social values, and refusing 
99 Cf. neDelsky, supra note 84, at 255 (describing property as a “second-order 
value” that “should be treated as instrumental to both rights and values, not as 
a primary value or a fundamental right”). Notably, Nedelsky’s reluctance to use 
property as the focal point of rights stems from the strong connection between 
property and boundaries, while her relational account rejects boundaries in favor 
of relationships. Id. at 130-34. Copyright as intellectual property suffers from 
the same focus on legally constructed boundaries.
100 Robertson v. Thomson Corp., [2006] S.C.C. 43 ¶ 70 (Can.).
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to construct a relationship between the collective society and distributors that 
would undermine these values.101 In CBC, Justice Abella’s dissent invoked 
the value of efficiency and innovation, looking at the relationship between 
the public broadcaster, multiple collectives, and the creators of musical 
works. She attempted to interpret the reproduction right in a way that would 
structure the relationships to foster rather than punish efficiencies generated 
by technological innovation.102 While none of these judgments completely or 
consciously adopts a relational approach as such, an appreciation of affected 
relationships and their implications for the core social values that copyright 
reflect is apparent in the reasoning of all of the cases we have considered 
as examples of expansive technological neutrality, almost by definition. In 
these cases, the emphasis is not on individual rights and the enforcement of 
legal boundaries, but on the public purposes of the law, and the question of 
when — and subject to what limits — to structure the parties’ relationship 
around the power to exclude and exploit. 
As we saw in Section II.A., when copyright is applied to new technological 
contexts, invoking the author’s right as the primary concern foretells a restrictive 
approach to technological neutrality: it is the perceived task of the decision-
maker simply to ensure that the right continues to be protected in novel 
circumstances. In cases where courts have expressly regarded authors’ rights not 
in isolation but in relation to other rights and interests (balancing the owner’s 
rights with users’ rights, typically with reference to the public interest and/or 
the interests of the innovator/competitor or consumer/citizen), we have seen a 
more expansive and substantive concept of technological neutrality emerge. 
The connection between a more nuanced and relational understanding of 
copyright and a more expansive vision of technological neutrality seems clear. 
Expansive technological neutrality may require either extending or restaining 
copyright in new contexts in order to strike an appropriate balance, serving 
the purposes of copyright and fostering the social values that it represents. 
Copyright’s limits (as with all reasonable limits to rights in the relational model) 
“cannot be specified in advance; they are, implicitly, open-ended and shifting, 
requiring judgment and debate.”103 This dynamic capacity to shift and change 
in response to changing circumstances — including the ability to limit rights 
and reshape legal relations — is vital to attaining technological neutrality in 
any real sense. A more relational approach to copyright can help build that 
101 Entm’t Software Ass’n (ESA) v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Can., [2012] S.C.C. 34 ¶¶ 9, 11 (Can.).
102 Can. Broad. Corp. (CBC) v. SODRAC 2003, Inc., [2015] S.C.C. 57 ¶¶ 129, 169 
(Can.).
103 neDelsky, supra note 84, at 246.
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capacity. A rigid commitment to guarding the boundaries of authors’ rights, 
on the other hand, forecloses such flexibility. Established rights can readily 
be imposed upon new technologies (it is not hard, after all, to find that a copy 
is a copy, a transmission is a communication, ownership is ownership), but 
they can just as readily upset the copyright balance and undermine the shared 
values that such rights ought to reflect. 
conclusIon
From the time of Gutenberg to the digital era of Generation Z, the manner in 
which we create and exchange information has evolved in dramatic ways, at 
sporadic but frequently alarming rates, and in often unanticipated directions. 
Developments in our information and communication technologies have 
enabled more rapid, diverse and far-reaching information flows, reshaping 
our cultural landscape, changing patterns of human relationships, and shifting 
social values. If legal rights are to construct relationships that reflect social 
values, then these legal rights cannot be rigid and unmoving, but must shift 
and change as new technologies change us. 
As one of the primary legal vehicles by which we regulate the controlled 
exchange of information resources, copyright law has become, rightly or 
wrongly, central to our evolving information system. As I have suggested, 
however, our copyright system lacks a consistent or concerted approach to 
responding to disruptive innovations in information technology. A firm adherence 
to protecting owners’ rights (and safeguarding established proprietary and 
economic relationships) has frequently produced a restrictive understanding 
of technological neutrality: rights are simply protected and extended without 
sufficient regard to changes in the technological means of their exploitation. 
Others, committed to ensuring consistency of outcome in the application of 
copyright law across technologies, have made efforts to apply the law equally 
to functionally equivalent acts. This search for a more substantive equality 
amongst old and new technologies has been guided by a more robust version 
of technological neutrality, to be sure. To focus on the outcome of particular 
activities and the past application of existing doctrine, however, is still unduly 
narrow. In contrast, I have identified (and commended) a more purposive 
understanding of technological neutrality. This approach takes an expansive 
view of the activity at issue, situated in the new technological context, and 
asks how the law ought to apply if it is to further the purposes of the copyright 
system. The consistency sought is not consistency in the application of the 
law, but in the steady pursuit of its normative objectives recalibrating the 
copyright balance as conditions change.
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This version of technological neutrality necessitates an understanding of 
copyright and other legal rights at issue in the context of the relations that have 
generated the problem. It requires the decision-maker to ask how these rights 
will shape the relevant relations, and whether those relations will advance the 
social values at stake in our copyright system. It may be that other versions of 
copyright, users’ rights or other rights and interests will produce new patterns 
of relationships that better serve these values. 
Seen in this way, technological neutrality is not the state of being independent 
of and immune to technological flux; indeed, there is no law — and no person 
— that can claim such a state. Rather, it is a guiding principle, encouraging 
us to ask how the development and application of our laws can consistently 
foster the social values we consider essential, even in the face of such flux. 
